Employment Effects of Brownfield
whether brownfield redevelopment creates new jobs or leads to the spatial reallocation of existing jobs; 4) the effect of levels of contamination, neighborhood conditions, and the location of brownfield sites on development outcomes; 5) policy efforts to tie brownfield redevelopment benefits to local residents and the un-or underemployed; and 6) the status of efforts to model brownfield revitalization.
1) Economic Development and the Cleanup Process
When the U.S. Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) in 1980, the law aimed both at identifying and cleaning up sites contaminated with hazardous substances and getting the parties who were responsible for the contamination to pay for the cleanup. To achieve these objectives, the liability for cleanup under CERCLA was retroactive, strict, and joint and several, where:
• "Retroactive" liability applies even to acts causing pollution years or decades before CERCLA became law.
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• "Strict" liability does not require the demonstration of any wrong-doing.
Even actions that were legal at the time they were taken could result in the actors being held accountable for the costs of cleanup and environmental damage.
• "Joint and several" liability is shared among the many parties who could be held responsible for the pollution. CERCLA created three general classes of potentially responsible parties (PRP): (1) generators of hazardous substances; (2) owners and operators of the site where the contamination is found; and (3) transporters with the authority to decide on the site for disposal of hazardous substances. The "joint and several" provision means any one or all of these PRPs may be held responsible for the entire cost of cleanup. Subsequent to the 1980 law and prior to 1996 revisions, lending institutions and local governments could also be held liable as PRPs (VanLandingham and Meyer 2002) .
CERCLA and its 1986 reauthorization (the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act) made a legislative commitment to restoring sites to their "natural" condition and holding those responsible for the contamination financially responsible.
Mired in controversy since its passage, reformers argued that the liability associated with redevelopment was driving the risks and costs of redeveloping so high that re-use was all but impossible. Critics of CERCLA argued it was necessary to remove barriers that were inhibiting economic development, especially at tens of thousands of lesser contaminated properties. Policy makers and analysts who were concerned about the deteriorating urban cores of U.S. cities were especially vocal. They argued that CERCLA's strong liability provision presented a sharp disincentive for economic development on contaminated sites, and that this legislation was contributing to the poverty and breakdown of city economies (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 1998; Wernstedt, Hersh, and Probst 1999; Hula 1999 ).
U.S. EPA responded by relaxing the notion that contaminated sites should be cleaned to their "natural" condition and by recognizing economic development as a legitimate goal. Less seriously contaminated sites were removed from the National Priorities List (NPL), the U.S. EPA relinquished authority over the cleanup standards of sites participating in many state-level non-Superfund Voluntary Cleanup Programs (VCP), and economic viability was established as a key factor in the granting of Federal EPA Brownfield Pilot grants.
Forty-eight states have now authorized Voluntary Cleanup Programs and more than eleven of these states have signed memoranda of agreement with the EPA to assume authority over cleanup standards (Bartsch and Deane 2002) . The general framework of most state programs includes (1) relaxed liability for purchases of contaminated properties where the new owner is not responsible for the contamination; (2) increased reliance on voluntary cleanup rather than government enforcement; (3) more flexible cleanup standards allowing parcels to be cleaned to standards appropriate to future use;
and (4) the provision of financial incentives. As of 2002, more than an estimated 30,000 sites entered state VCP programs (Bartsch and Deane 2002) .
Hula captures this change in focus from purely environmental cleanup to economic redevelopment in his review of Michigan brownfield programs and interviews with public officials. One local development official stated:
And so a lot of people call the Department of Environmental Quality today the "Department of Economic Development" because they wholly, at least at the upper administration levels, totally embraced the idea of doing whatever it takes to encourage business while still protecting the environment (Hula 1999, p. 15 sales of these properties accelerated over the decade of the 1990s, with only 10 percent occurring prior to 1995 and 90 percent occurring after.
2) Employment Creation on Brownfield Sites: What do we know?
The literature on the employment effects of brownfields redevelopment consists primarily of case studies that measure employment effects by counting the number of jobs planned or currently existing on remediated sites. Bartsch and Deane (2002) collected data on the number of sites cleaned and the reuse benefits of brownfields in the A review of numerous case studies shows a similar methodology of collecting data from local and state economic and environmental officials and developers. Several of these studies are summarized in Appendix 1. While the number of cases reported in the literature has grown too large to summarize completely, a review of the case studies examined yields several conclusions:
1) The average project in which jobs are created appears to yield about 10 jobs per acre.
2)
When jobs are created, the new use is most likely to be industrial and commercial. Residential and recreational developments are both less common and create fewer direct jobs.
3) The median public cost per job created is about $14,000 (Pepper 1997 , Gilliland 1999 , U.S. National Conference of Mayors 1999 and 2004, U.S.
EPA 2006).
For our purposes, we learn more from what is not covered and the shortcomings of these cases, which are: 1) They do not identify whether jobs were newly created or reallocated across space. Even when the study reports jobs retained, we do not know where they would have gone if they moved.
2) The studies pay little attention to the number of jobs created in the remediation and construction phases of development.
3) The studies do not attempt to measure the share of jobs that went to the un-or underemployed.
4)
No attention is paid to the quality of the jobs, i.e., whether there are opportunities for upward mobility.
5)
No attention is paid to the stability of these jobs over time.
6)
None of the cases report spin-off employment impacts in the surrounding community.
7)
None of the studies track the wider neighborhood development impacts, e.g., rising incomes, reduced crime, etc. There are findings from the general economic development literature that can advance our understanding of the impact of brownfield remediation on job creation and neighborhood revitalization. A meta-analysis by Bartik (1991) reviews econometric studies that attempt to measure the impact of employment growth on local unemployment and labor force participation. Generally these studies find that many jobs from economic expansion go to in-migrants (new residents) to the metro area, but job growth does lower the unemployment rate and raise the labor force participation rate. These studies disagree, however, on the share of jobs that go to in-migrants versus the resident unemployed or new entrants to the labor market (Bartik 1991, p. 84 When drawing from a metropolitan labor market, firms are likely to find the skill mix they are looking for. This is less likely in a neighborhood. Second, the "shock" Bartik models is a 1 percent increase in metropolitan employment. This shock is larger than what we could expect from most brownfield redevelopments.
Many brownfield case studies report benefits to the wider community (Pepper 1997 ). However, a cursory review of the available case studies indicates that when wider revitalization is observable and measurable, this wider neighborhood revitalization is rarely solely attributable to the redevelopment of one brownfield. Rather, the revitalized brownfield is usually one piece to the larger puzzle. For example, Pepper (1997) reports that Wynadotte, an industrial town south of Detroit, has made a major comeback from economic decline. The remediation of the contaminated sites, BASF South and North
Works, was one component of a massive city wide effort that included a golf course, the rehabilitation of 500 substandard residential buildings, the creation of open space and a park opening up to the waterfront, and consolidation so that new, larger and more modern residential areas could be built (Pepper 1997 ).
This conclusion is supported by Hula (1999) in his review of the Michigan brownfield policy. Hula (1999, pp. 22-23) Zone program finds that employment growth in the zone, where incentives are offered, is no greater than employment change in the adjacent and equally distressed neighborhoods that did not receive development incentives and subsidies. Peters and Fisher's (1998) research fails to find evidence that zone incentives result in a positive impact on employment growth. They report that a wider review of the literature on this topic is consistent with their findings. They conclude that "[e]nterprise zones are not effective engines of economic expansion" (p. 190). They suggest that the absence of any impact may be due to the fact Enterprise and Empowerment Zones are always located in the most distressed neighborhoods, plagued by crime, infrastructure deterioration, and lowskilled workers. It is likely the incentives do not make up for the negatives (p. 191).
In contrast, Bartik's review of the literature argues that incentives can influence firm location decisions and promote local labor demand and is more likely to be cost effective when applied to poorer places. The reason is the reservation wages are lower in high unemployment areas (Bartik 1991, Fisher and Peters 1998) . Three conclusions can be drawn from this literature relevant to job creation and brownfield remediation. One is that remediation is a necessary but not sufficient condition to neighborhood revitalization (Howland 2000 and 2004b , Leigh and Coffin 2005 . Revitalization will require additional incentives, subsidies, and social programs and even then, it is unrealistic to expect dramatic neighborhood revivals, falling unemployment, rising incomes in the short run.
3) Net New Jobs or Job Relocation
Researchers and policy makers in the economic development field debate the value of net new jobs to the economy versus a spatial reallocation of jobs and how to distinguish between the two. Is economic development a zero-sum game? Bartik argues that it is not a zero-sum game because the nation benefits when jobs go to highunemployment areas rather than low-unemployment areas (Bartik 1991) . The opportunity cost of an unemployed worker is lower than the opportunity cost of an already employed worker. Thus there is a greater net gain to the national economy. In the case of a brownfield cleanup, there is an additional net national gain because a previous unused resource, land, is now added to the land supply and an operational business on this remediated site adds to national growth when previously unemployed workers are drawn into the labor force. Thus, a number of economists argue that from a national equity perspective the debate between net new jobs or spatial reallocation is a senseless one, as long a jobs move from less to more distressed areas (Bartik 1991) .
Overall national welfare is improved if jobs are reallocated to areas that are historically poorer, where residents are in greatest need of jobs and local governments in greatest need of tax revenues.
As suggested here, this literature is theoretical rather than empirical. There are empirical studies from the economic development literature that examine the impact of public subsidies to firms willing to locate or expand in distressed economies; does the subsidy lead them to start-up, continue operating when they might otherwise close, or to relocate from another site. The most common methodologies are to ask firms what they would have done "but for" the subsidy (Howland 1990) or observe behaviors in identical local economies where the subsidy was available and not available (Dewar 2001) . The results show that where a subsidy has an impact, it influences new jobs, the relocation of jobs, and saves jobs. For example, in a study of subsidies to rural manufacturers, 72% of the firms said they would not have made the same investment in the same location without the subsidy (Howland 1990) . While I could locate no study that addresses this question specifically for brownfield redevelopments, there is no reason to expect the results to differ on a redevelopment site subsequent to environmental cleanup.
The following section presents some of the complications of revitalizing neighborhoods surrounding brownfield sites.
4) Environmental Cleanup and Employment Effects in the Current Policy

Environment
Contamination and Neighborhood Conditions
One of the major challenges in creating viable economies on and around former brownfield sites is that they are often to be found in distressed neighborhoods with concentrations of poverty, crime, deteriorating infrastructure, and low-skilled workers. In prices fell more the nearer the residence was to the most polluted portion of the harbor.
The price discounts ranged between $7,000 and $10,000 per residence depending on distance. Ketkar (1992) However, the land price decline was not as great as for the actively contaminated sites.
McCluskey and Rausser (2003) case study found that higher income households were willing to bid more for housing further from the smelter, even after the site had been remediated. The authors attribute this to the negative externalities of poverty closer to the smelter site. The authors argue that this is due to the long-term stigma associated with neighborhoods surrounding a previously contaminated site. Their results show that the neighborhood externality effect is strong and the stigma may be long term (McCluskey and Rausser 2003) . McGrath (1995) and Howland (2004a, 200b) Thus, the economic development challenges at a brownfield site often extend beyond site cleanup. Where job skills are low, poverty rates are high, schools are of lower quality and residents possess weak job skills, redevelopment is complex. The more contaminated and noxious the site, the more likely community redevelopment will be complicated by concentrations of poverty, crime, low-levels of education, and poor work skills.
Tradeoffs between Achieving Brownfield Redevelopment vs. Environmental Justice
Because the most toxic sites often correlate with the most distressed neighborhoods, policy-makers are likely to face a tradeoff in their pursuit of both environmental justice and economic development. Several researchers have documented that low income communities and minorities tend to reside in closer proximity to hazardous waste sites, industrial facilities releasing toxic pollutants, and facilities using toxic chemicals in industrial production.
A Many disadvantaged communities continue to face significant barriers to redevelopment. They face the challenge of bringing private investment into areas where property values are low, the market for redevelopment is weak, infrastructure is deteriorating, skilled labor is in short supply and the lack of basic assets or amenities repel private investment (Tyson 2005, Heberle and Wernstedt 2006) . These communities lack the financial resources needed for cleanup and redevelopment, and the information about the funding resources and finance tools that do exist. Moreover, many disadvantaged communities must grapple with the challenges associated with redeveloping smaller sites like abandoned gas stations and corner lots that blight neighborhoods and are often difficult to redevelop due to economies of scale. Finally, they must wrestle with the challenge of how to ensure that current community residents receive their fair share of the benefits of redevelopment, such as new jobs and housing.
While one of the goals in brownfield remediation is to rectify the injustices to poor and minority communities by cleaning the hazardous sites in their neighborhoods, when we focus solely on the employment creation and revitalization goals of a cleanup, environmental justice can be compromised. The lack of economic vitality and the lack of local resources and capacity in these disadvantaged areas exacerbate the brownfield problems because cleanup and redevelopment is not profitable (Tyson 2005 , Brownfield News 2006 ).
An important environmental justice consideration is ensuring that local residents benefit from successful redevelopment. Lance Stokes in Brownfield News (2006) 
Employment Creation vs. Level of Cleanup
A third tradeoff is the compromise between spending scarce public money on remediating a site to a pristine condition versus cleaning only to a standard that limits permitted uses to industry or retail, requires specific site designs, and excludes residential uses. Linking a site's potential land use, cleanup standards, and remediation strategy can promote economic development while lowering public subsidies.
This tradeoff includes an environmental justice component as well. With many of the most contaminated sites in low-income neighborhoods, efforts to retain the highest cleanup standards will squeeze economic feasibility and possibly rule out redevelopment.
On the other side of the argument, some critics see concessions on cleanup standards as a sign of environmental injustice. For example, critics of the Michigan brownfield initiative see the implementation of less stringent residual contamination standards, designed to promote economic development, as creating patterns of environmental injustice. That is, minority and low-income residents are put at greater health risks simply because of their proximity to redevelopment sites that are not cleaned to the highest standards (Hula 1999) .
One example is being implemented in the Camden Crossing housing project in Baltimore, where supplementary covenants put restrictions on parcels that limit the way an owner interacts with the property into the future. In spite of the heavy levels of contamination on this 9-acre site, the city agreed with local citizens to allow a residential end use. Located in the seriously distressed "Pig Town" neighborhood, remediation of this site supports city goals of environmental justice. However, limitations on both city funding and constraints on final housing sales prices meant that land could not be cleaned to a standard that permitted human contact with the dirt in the townhouse backyards.
Maryland's Department of the Environment (MDE) signed off on institutional controls, which forbid residents from breaking the concrete seal that developers are placing in their backyards. Critics, including some MDE staff, believe this cleanup standard is not high enough and goals of environmental justice are not met for the sake of economic development (Howland 2003) . Other researchers and policy-makers question as well whether institutional controls ultimately work to protect public safety (Wernstedt et al.1999 ).
Baltimore's experience also highlights the complexity of cleaning a highly Wernstedt, et al. (1999) found that in the last several years, examples of residential level cleanups in clearly industrial or commercial areas have not been as common as they were in the earlier years of the Superfund program. The presumable explanation is EPA's willingness to modify cleanup standards, eliminating the feasibility of housing on the site, in order to promote economic development.
In recent years EPA has shown an increasing sensitivity to the cleanup leveleconomic development tradeoff. One approach available within the framework of Superfund is the consideration of risk management techniques to control costs (Wernstedt and Hersh 1998) . With this approach to remediation, site managers can control costs by addressing the most contaminated areas of a site with aggressive treatment, while treating other portions of the parcel less aggressively. Many states have picked up on EPA's lead and have implemented regulations that recognize the use of multiple techniques to address site risks (Graves 1997) . Any time remediation costs are lowered, economic development prospects are improved.
Linking potential land uses and remediation remedies is appealing from an economic development perspective. Remedies tied to future land use have the potential of reducing cleanup costs, encouraging re-use and site redevelopment, and promoting neighborhood revitalization. However, Wernstedt and Hersh's (1998) case study of the Industri-Plex site in Woburn, Massachusetts highlights a "troubling lack of integration" between the accepted remedy and the development of institutional controls that will insure the long-run integrity of the site's safety and protection of the public.
Designing Projects so they have the Greatest Development Spin-offs
A potential tradeoff occurs in selecting projects with more immediate redevelopment payoff versus giving a higher priority to projects with greater long-term potential for economic revitalization and improvement in neighborhood property values (Black 1995 , Iannone 1996 , Meyer 1999 , Simons, Bowen and Sementelli 1997 , Leigh and Coffin 2005 . Pepper (1997) emphasizes the importance of selecting brownfield sites that will lead to further economic revitalization. This was the case of the Medical City Project in Worcester, MA. The local development authority worked to consolidate 32 parcels over 24 acres in one of Worcester's most distressed neighborhoods. The project required a minimum of $42 million in public funding. Citizens participated in the project design, and their input resulted in integrating the project with the existing neighborhood.
For example, the entrance to the complex was moved from the east to west side so that the development interacted with the city's downtown area and public spaces were added to the design (Pepper 1997) . The size of the project, its downtown location, and the alterations in design increased the spinoff benefits to the surrounding community.
5) Linking Jobs to Local Residents
Site redevelopment and wider neighborhood benefits will occur with less friction when the employers attracted to the redeveloped site's workforce needs match the skills of the local labor force. When businesses hire local residents there should be increased local tax revenues, better public services, and a reduction in antisocial activities, such as EPA has launched a campaign to require that applicants for brownfield funds notify and actively involve the local community in planning decisions surrounding the use and design of brownfield redevelopments. Where state and local government funding is central to a project, community involvement is increasingly encouraged at the local level as well. When the community is involved, it is more likely that newly created jobs on brownfield sites will be reserved for local residents. There are at least four methods used to link residents to newly created jobs: 1) public or private sector initiated workforce training to prepare local residents for the new jobs coming on-line; 2) training to improve local resident job search and interview skills; 3) financial incentives for businesses to hire local workers; and 4) formal community or government agreements with businesses to hire a proportion of local residents.
Training programs
Job creation can occur at four stages: remediation, construction, operation, and then in multipliers to the wider community. The EPA has provided national leadership in encouraging local residents' involvement at the remediation phase of development. In , 1997) . There has been no follow up on any of these promising efforts. We should find out whether these local hires stayed on the job? Did they work out for the employer?
One argument against training grants to funnel local low-income residents into remediation jobs is that it encourages their employment in occupations with elevated health risks. This argument contends that because minorities and low-income residents are already more likely to live in hazardous areas, working in such areas does not promote environmental justice (Ellis et al. 2002) .
Provision of job search skills
Aside from job training, local training can focus on such skills as resume writing and interviewing.
Financial incentives
Local hiring is also encouraged through state and municipal tax incentives.
Florida takes the most aggressive stand on linking jobs to brownfield remediation. The state offers certain businesses a $2,500 tax credit − "a brownfield bonus" − per job created at a remediated site. In 2002 the legislature modified the "brownfield bonus,"
making it available to companies that create jobs at any site within a designated brownfield area. In addition, a company may also qualify for a tax refund of at least 20 percent of the average wage of the jobs created, provided that they provide benefits to their employees, make a capital investment of at least $2 million, and create at least 10 jobs (Register 2001, Bartsch and Deane 2002 However, there is no formal agreement between the employers and the local community that guarantees local residents access to the new jobs. "Thus, their claim on the employment 'asset' remains tenuous" (Dixon 2000, p. 8) .
Many brownfield redevelopments receive public funds, and Krumholz argues that such subsidy agreements should include a condition for local hiring. Additional requirements might give the highest priority to residents who have been unemployed for longer periods of time, or could mandate reimbursement of the city or state (i.e., a "clawback" provision) when a business fails to follow through on promises for local hiring. Several cities, not necessarily in brownfield redevelopments, have used this strategy (Krumholz 1995) .
End user hiring commitments
Taking community input a step further; some brownfield projects have included formal agreements with end users that commit the latter to a certain percentage of local hiring (Dixon 2000) . Community groups can work with the developer to promote community benefits such as targeted job training and local "first source" job agreements that require site developers to reserve a percentage of newly-created jobs for local residents.
Although they still need proper training and skills, hiring agreements give local residents a leg up in the hiring process. One example is the Quarry Retail Project in Minneapolis, which removed a significant environmental hazard from a low-income neighborhood, brought needed retail services to the community, and also increased the number of jobs on the site from less than 250 to 2000. The developer of the site agreed to reserve 20% of jobs for minority and local residents. While the city provides some funds for training, the local retailers conduct most training in-house (Pepper 1997 , Dixon 2000 .
East Palo Alto has also implemented a "first source" hiring program to benefit local residents. Under the program, the city has required all employers in its redevelopment projects to commit to a hiring process aimed at drawing 30 percent of new Although community groups generally benefit from citizen participation in the brownfield redevelopment process, several authors have pointed out complications. In some cases, citizens may oppose redevelopment when they are afraid it will lead to gentrification (Solitare 2003) . Greenberg and Lewis (2000) surveyed over 200 residents of largely Hispanic census tracts in Perth Amboy, New Jersey to determine their preferences for outcomes in the brownfield development process. Residents preferred an end use of recreational, cultural, and community facilities, followed by housing. Even though they create more jobs, industrial and commercial activities were of lower priority because of gentrification fears.
Citizens may also press for uses that are not economically feasible on a site, given its location or contamination levels. Wernstedt et al. (1999) While this type of modeling is a step forward in measuring the costs and benefits of brownfield redevelopment, there are many immeasurable and non-economic goals that should also factor into the decision process. For example:
1) How do we take into account the site's context, i.e. is it in a high amenity area on the water front or in a long distressed region?
2)
What is the impact of residential or recreational developments where no new jobs are created? Surrounding property values should increase, tax revenues should rise, and revitalization should follow.
3) How much weight should we put on projects that occur in the lowest income neighborhoods or that achieve "smart growth" goals of preserving There are tradeoffs between financial feasibility and tackling the most contaminated sites in the most distressed neighborhoods, and heavy government subsidies are required to scale these tradeoffs towards the latter. In industrial areas, where there is still demand for industrial land, redevelopment is easier to tackle. Updating infrastructure, improving services, consolidating parcels, and eliminating conflicting uses will need to follow clean up in order to revive aging industrial districts.
The case study literature has exploded, citing cases where cleanups were the precursor to neighborhood turnaround. However, these individual cases fail to dissect the actions that were critical, important, or irrelevant to revitalization and track only shortrun effects. We still don't know what happens 10 to 20 years down the road. Does crime decline, do local residents improve their economic standing, or does gentrification displace the previous residents? The answers to these questions will take a more longrange analysis than we have seen so far.
Another direction is the refinement of the modeling approach proposed by BenDor and Metcalf. Refinements could include better estimates of the spin-off benefits in neighborhoods with diverse characteristics.
The literature does highlight many positive developments and experiments.
Apparent successes involve large scale plans that integrate site cleanup with wider community plans, the growing tendency to link jobs on brownfield sites to local residents, increasingly sophisticated subsidies and incentives, and the importance of design that integrates redevelopment with the existing neighborhood. In many cases, redevelopment strategies should focus on attracting employers who will hire local workers. Disadvantaged communities and government also face the challenge of ensuring that brownfields are redeveloped with sustainable projects using clean manufacturing and renewable energy, and not replaced with facilities that will create more blight for the next generation. 
